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18	CALIFORNIA VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE	Case No.37-2008-00075326-CU-CO-CTL  MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND	
19	Plaintiff,	AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY	
20	vs.	ADJUDICATION MOTION BY INTERVENORS	
22	CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL	Date: April 26, 2013 Time: 2:00 p.m.	
23	COMMISSION,	Dept: 62 Judge: Hon. Ronald Styn Trial Date: May 13, 2011	
24	Defendant.		
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Memo of PAs in Opposition to Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication Motion by Intervenors

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 Plaintiff CALIFORNIA VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE ("the Tribe" or "Miwok Tribe" or "Plaintiff") submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion/Summary Adjudication filed by the Intervenors.

I.

#### INTRODUCTION

The Court of Appeal granted Plaintiff California Valley Miwok Tribe's ("Miwok Tribe") petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift its stay of these proceedings, so as to allow the parties to file dispositive motions and, if necessary, proceed to trial. This did not include the Intervenors, since the lifting of the stay also reinstated the dismissal of the Intervenors.

On March 11, 2011, the trial court granted the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the court's previous order granting intervention and denied intervention. The ruling was based in part on a December 22, 2010 decision from the Assistant Secretary of Interior ("ASI"), which had concluded that the Miwok Tribe is a federally-recognized tribe consisting of five members with a recognized governing body established under a 1998 Tribal Resolution. The ASI further ruled that the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") could not require the Tribe to expand its membership against its will.

After the March 11, 2011 order denying intervention, the ASI set aside its decision to allow for further briefing on the issues, which prompted the trial court in this case to enter an April 20, 2011 ex parte order staying the "effect" of the court's March 11, 2011 order denying intervention. When the ASI issued its final decision on August 31, 2011, affirming its December 22, 2010, decision, this court stayed all further proceedings in this case, except for discovery, pending resolution of a challenge to the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision by the Intervenors in this case, Yakima Dixie ("Dixie") and his followers.

The Court of Appeal decision granting Plaintiff's petition directing the trial court to lift its stay applies with equal force to the trial court's April 20, 2011 ex parte order staying the effect of its March 11, 2011 order. Their only Thus, the Intervenors have been dismissed. recourse per the April 20, 2011 order is to seek reconsideration or appeal. And since their time has expired to seek reconsideration, which ran from the date of the remittitur, the Intervenors' only recourse is to file an appeal of the March 11, 2011 order. Moreover, the legal basis for the order denying intervention has not changed. The individual Intervenors do not have standing to assert a claim to RSTF money as a matter of law. Indeed, the factual basis for denying intervention on March 11, 2011 was correct at the time, and it is still correct.

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In granting the Plaintiff's petition, the Court of Appeal ordered that the trial court need only acknowledge that the federal dispute is ongoing, but is to decide independently whether the Commission is justified in withholding the subject Revenue Sharing Trust Fund ("RSTF") payments from the Miwok Tribe for all of the reasons stated by the Commission, which includes: (1) There is a Tribal leadership dispute calling into question who is authorized to receive the RSTF for the Tribe; (2) The Tribe's governing body is not recognized by the BIA for purposes of receiving federal contract funding; (3) The Tribe's membership does not consist of Indians in the surrounding area; (4) The Tribe must first qualify for federal contact funding to be eligible to receive RSTF payments; and (4) the Tribe must wait until the pending federal litigation is concluded.

Undisputed facts establish that the Commission has no legal basis to continue to withhold the subject RSTF money from the Tribe. This is based on the recent deposition testimony of Dixie admitting that he resigned from the Tribe in 1999 and that he acknowledged Burley as the Tribal leader, as well as the language of the 1999 tribal-state gaming compacts ("Compacts") limiting the Commission's discretion on RSTF distributions to Non-Compact tribes. Dixie's deposition testimony that he resigned nullifies his challenge to Burley as the Tribal leader.

Council under Burley's leadership is in fact <u>currently</u> recognized by the federal government. The ASI's August 31, 2011 decision is analogous to a judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief. To this end the implementing stay language only applies to the injunctive relief portion of the decision directing the BIA to refrain from further efforts to reorganize the Tribe against its wishes. It does not apply to the declaratory relief portion of the decision declaring that the Tribal Council is currently recognized, and that the Tribe consists of only five members.

Plaintiff's claims of declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a writ of mandate, were properly approved by the Court of Appeal in this case, thus making that ruling the law of the case.

II.

#### ARGUMENT

A. THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION DIRECTING THAT THE STAY BE LIFTED HAD THE EFFECT OF REINSTATING THE MARCH 11, 2011 ORDER DISMISSING THE INTERVENORS

The March 11, 2011 order of this court denying intervention was never vacated or set aside. Instead, on April 20, 2011, this court merely stayed the "effect" of that order with respect to the Intervenors as follows:

\* \* \*

The effect of the Court's prior rulings shall likewise be stayed pending further order of this Court. These

rulings include: (1) Order of March 11, 2011, granting reconsideration and denying intervention..."

(April 20, 2011 Order, page 2, lines 22-25, Plain. Req. for Judicial Notice ("pRJN"), Ex. "34"). On March 1, 2013, this Court, following the remittitur from the Court of Appeal, lifted the stay. Thus, by lifting its stay, this Court reinstated its March 11, 2011 order denying intervention.

At the time of the April 20, 2011 order, the Intervenors had on calendar a motion for reconsideration, which the Court took "off calendar, without prejudice."

(RJN, Ex. "34", page 3, line 14). Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, as they were required to do, the Intervenors chose to file a motion for summary judgment. However, because they are dismissed parties, they have no right to file any dispositive motions in this case. The Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to either entertain or grant a summary judgment motion by or in favor of a dismissed party. For this reason alone, the Intervenors' purported motion for summary judgment should be denied without more.

### B. THE TRIBAL COUNCIL UNDER BURLEY'S LEADERSHIP IS IN FACT CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED

The thrust of the Intervenors' (and the Commission's) argument against an order releasing the RSTF money to the Tribe under Burley's leadership is that the BIA does not currently acknowledge any Tribal government until the pending federal litigation challenging the ASI's August 31,

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2011 decision is concluded. This contention is without merit and misleading.

The premise of this argument is based on the erroneous interpretation of the implementing stay language of the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision, which was to merely stay the implementation of that decision, not to void the effective nature of the decision itself, especially with respect to the decision's declaration of rights that the Tribal Council is currently recognized.

Immediately after stating that "implementation" of his decision was "stayed" pending resolution of the federal litigation, the ASI in his August 31, 2011 decision requested that the parties, i.e., Burley and Dixie, attempt to resolve their long-standing Tribal leadership dispute within the Tribe's "existing government structure." He stated:

"Finally, I strongly encourage the parties to work within the <u>Tribe's existing government structure</u> to resolve this longstanding dispute and bring this contentious period in the tribe's history to a close." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "3", page 8). Obviously, the parties cannot do this, if the implementing stay language is erroneously interpreted to mean that the Tribe has no present, recognized governing body. Had the ASI intended that his decision be completely ineffective pending the resolution of the federal case, he would have either left this language out or modified it by saying that in light of his implementing stay, the Tribe has no governing body, and

therefore, once the federal litigation is concluded the parties can resume to work out their Tribal leadership dispute within the Tribe's governing body. But he did not say that. Clearly, the ASI concluded that despite the implementing stay language in his decision, the Tribe still had an "existing government structure" to which they can resort to address internal Tribal matters.

Significantly, this key provision comes immediately after the ASI's implementing stay paragraph, and is the last provision of the decision, thus emphasizing the fact that the Tribe continues to have a recognized governing body despite the fact that implementation of the decision with respect to any BIA actions is stayed.

This language also cuts against the Intervenors' (and Commission's) argument that because the ASI's decision applies "prospectively," the prior erroneous BIA actions against the Tribe have somehow been "resurrected," including the prior erroneous statements that the Tribe has no recognized governing body and no recognized leader. This statement further supports the Tribe's position that the phrase "implementation shall be stayed" only means that the decision cannot be carried out by the BIA to, for example, award federal contract funding to the Tribe, or take any other actions by the BIA toward the Tribe's benefit. It does not, and from this statement cannot mean, that the ASI's substantive decision with respect to a "declaration of rights" is of "no force and effect." Clearly, the ASI has stated ("declared") here that the

Tribe's "existing government structure," i.e., the resolution form of government established under Resolution #GC-98-01, must continue to be recognized and function for purposes of resolving internal Tribal matters despite the pending federal litigation brought by Dixie.

This key provision also explains the following ruling in the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision, repeated several times throughout his decision:

"...The five acknowledged citizens are the only current citizens of the Tribe, and the Tribe's General Council is authorized to exercise the Tribe's governmental authority. In this case, again, the factual record is clear: there are only five citizens of CVMT. The Federal government is under no duty or obligation to 'potential citizens' of the CVMT.

Those potential citizens, if they so desire, should take up their cause with the CVMT general Council directly." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "3", page 7). Thus, because the ASI's implementing stay does not affect the existing governing body of the Tribe, the individual Intervenors, as well as any other "potential" citizens, can apply for tribal membership with the currently recognized Tribal Council, without having to wait for the resolution of the pending federal action. This is because, as recognized by this Court in its prior decision, "[a]n Indian tribe has the power to define membership as it chooses, subject to the plenary power of Congress." (Bates 0197, page 8, footnote 9 of the Opinion, citing Williams v. Gover (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3d 785, 789. That is not to say that the Tribe will

accept them as members, since that decision is the Tribe's alone to make. Williams v. Gover, supra.

In fact, the <u>federal District Court</u> has <u>acknowledged</u> that the Tribe is <u>currently recognized</u> despite the Intervenors' present challenge to the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision in federal court. In granting the Tribe's motion to intervene in that federal action, the U.S. District Court stated:

"Third, plaintiffs' [Dixie's group] 'threaten[s] to impair,' (citation omitted) the proposed intervenor's legally protected interest because resolution of the matter in the plaintiffs' favor would directly interfere with <a href="tel:the governance of the Tribe as currently recognized">the governance of the Tribe as currently recognized</a> and preclude access to federal funds."

(Intervenors' Ex. "15", page 10).

If the Intervenors' (and the Commission's) interpretation concerning the meaning of the phrase "implementation shall be stayed" in the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision were to be accepted, then the BIA would have resumed its efforts to organize the Tribe against the Tribe's will. The BIA had previously published notice in a newspaper of a general council meeting to be sponsored by the BIA, and sought to initiate the "reorganization" of the Tribe itself. (Page 3 of December 22, 2010 ASI letter). In response, the August 31, 2011 decision expressly stated:

"Accordingly, unless asked by the CVMT General Council, the Department will make no further efforts to assist the Tribe to organize and define its citizenship. I accept the Resolution #GC-98-01 as the interim governing document of the Tribe, and as the basis for

resuming government-to-government relations between the United State and the Tribe." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "3", page 7). The fact that the BIA has not resumed its efforts to reorganize the tribe against the Tribe's will confirms that the BIA itself respects and is abiding by the August 31, 2011 decision. If in fact the implementing stay language means that the decision has no force and effect, and that the prior BIA decisions stating that the Tribe has no recognized government have been reinstated as the Intervenors and the Commission argue, then the BIA would have resumed its efforts to reorganize the Tribe, as if the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision did not Clearly, the BIA has not done so, because the exist. August 31, 2011 decision prohibits it from doing so. Thus, the only kind of things the implementing stay language prohibits the BIA from doing is conduct that amount to carrying out the decision's terms, as, for example, in taking steps to enter into contracts with the Tribe for 638 federal contract funding. Resuming its efforts in reorganizing the Tribe would not be implementing the decision, because nowhere in the decision does it provide that the BIA is permitted to do so.

The same would be true with the ASI's "declaration of rights" that the Tribal Council under Burley's leadership is recognized. While the implementation of that declaratory ruling has been stayed, that declaration of rights is still valid and effective.

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## C. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR NEVER "STIPULATED" TO CHANGE THE STAY LANGUAGE OF HIS DECISION

Contrary to the Intervenors' assertion, there is no evidence that the ASI ever stipulated that his August 31, 2011 decision would have "no force and effect" in a joint status report filed in the federal action before the Tribe (P/As, page 7). Nowhere in this was allowed to intervene. joint status report do the words "stipulate," "stipulation," or "agree" appear. In fact, the federal court never adopted the language "of no force and effect" in any order he signed. The "proposed order" the Intervenors point to was never signed. Instead, the federal court simply issued a minute order on September 9, 2011, directing the parties to propose a schedule, but said nothing about the ASI's decision having "no force and effect."

Indeed, a joint status report is not a stipulation.

D. THE TERM "STAYING IMPLEMENTATION" IN THE ASI'S AUGUST 31, 2011 DECISION IS MERELY ANALOGOUS TO "STAYING EXECUTION" OF A JUDGMENT OR ORDER

Because the Commission can do nothing to "implement" the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision, releasing the RSTF money to the Tribe, or an order directing the Commission to do so, cannot be viewed as implementing that decision. This is because the Commission is not subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA, DOI or the ASI with respect to the RSTF money, and there is nothing in the August 31, 2011

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decision that ruled on the Commission's actions in withholding the Tribe's RSTF money.

Staying implementation of the August 31, 2011 decision is analogous to staying execution of a judgment after it is The stay of execution does not render the rendered. judgment or order void, or "of no force and effect." Ιt merely means the judgment creditor cannot enforce it (i.e., implement it) and collect on it by garnishing a judgment debtor's wages, bank accounts, etc. For the same reason, staying implementation of the August 31, 2011 decision does not render the decision of "no force and effect." It only means that the persons and entities who are subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA and DOI cannot make decisions or take actions in accordance with that decision, i.e., put the decision into effect. And since the Commission is not subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA or DOI, it can do nothing to implement that decision in any way. The Commission does not award tribes federal grants.

# E. THE ASI'S AUGUST 31, 2011 DECISION IS ANALOGOUS TO A JUDICIAL DECISION FOR A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Significantly, the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision made certain rulings analogous to a declaration of rights and injunctive relief. He <u>declared</u> the Tribe's existing Tribal Council to be one the DOI would recognize and that Tribal membership was only five in number. Analogous to injunctive relief, he <u>directed</u> the BIA to refrain from attempting to "reorganize" the Tribe against the Tribe's wishes. Thus, analogous to a stay of execution of a

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- F. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS TO CONTINUE TO WITHHOLD THE TRIBE'S RSTF PAYMENTS
  - 1. The undisputed facts show that the Tribe is entitled to receive the subject RSTF money now.

The undisputed facts relative to the Tribe's entitlement to the RSTF money and the Commission's wrongful withholding of those funds are as follows:

- 1. Plaintiff Miwok Tribe is a federally-recognized tribe. (Para 8 FAC, as verified by Silvia Burley).
- 2. Under the Compacts, Non-Compact tribes are entitled to receive \$1.1 million a year paid on a quarterly basis. These payments are from license fees paid to the Commission by Compact tribes for distribution to qualifying Non-Compact tribes. However, the only requirement for eligibility for receipt of RSTF payments is that the Non-Compact tribe be a federally-recognized tribe and operate less than 350 gaming devices. (pRJN, Ex. "5", §4.3.2 of Compacts)
- 3. Plaintiff Miwok Tribe is a Non-Compact tribe under the Compacts. It operates no gaming devices. (Undisputed)
- 4. While not a requirement, Plaintiff Miwok Tribe operates under a resolution form of government which was

- 5. In 2005, the Commission suspended its quarterly payments to the Miwok Tribe and decided to hold the funds indefinitely for later distribution, citing "the lack of a recognized tribal government or leadership," and because the Miwok Tribe is not "organized" under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA"). The Commission further pointed to a Tribal leadership dispute between Burley and Dixie, where Dixie claimed he, not Burley, is the rightful Tribal leader. (pRJN, Ex. "6").
- 6. The Commission has explained that "in situations involving tribal leadership disputes," it takes its lead" from the BIA, and because the BIA has suspended the Miwok Tribe's federal contract funding, the Commission has decided to do likewise with respect to the Tribe's RSTF payments. (pRJN, Ex. "6" and "7").
- 7. These reasons are not supported by the language of the Compacts and are contrary to the express provisions in the Compacts <u>limiting</u> the Commission's discretion to serving as a mere <u>depository</u> of the RSTF.

  (§4.3.2.1(b)) ("no discretion with respect to the use or disbursement of the trust funds"). (pRJN, Ex. "5").
- 8. Because the Commission has been withholding the Miwok Tribe's RSTF payments since 2005, it is not in compliance with Gov. Code § 12012.90(e)(2) directing that the Commission "make quarterly payment...to each eligible recipient Indian Tribe within 45 days of the end of each

fiscal quarter," thereby entitling Plaintiff to declaratory and injunctive relief. CCP§1060.

### 2. The Commission's reasons for withholding the subject RSTF money are wrong.

The Commission has denied that it "violated its legal duties by withholding Plaintiff's entitled share to RSTF money and by refusing to distribute such funds to Plaintiff, for the reasons alleged [in the FAC], and until Plaintiff settles its ongoing leadership dispute..." (pRJN, Ex. "7" and "8"). The grounds for these denials are summarized in judicially noticeable letters the Commission wrote to the Tribe, which clarify that it suspended RSTF payments because: (1) the Tribe has no recognized governing body; (2) the Tribe has no recognized leader; (3) the Tribe fails to include or protect the interests of a significant number of potential members; and (4) there is an ongoing leadership dispute. (pRJN, Ex. "6", letter from Commissioner Shelton, dated June 26, 2007

In addition, the Commission explained its affirmative defenses in its recent answers to interrogatories as follows: "The California Valley Miwok Tribe is unorganized and its membership, i.e., the body politic which comprises the California Valley Miwok Tribe and which may select its government, is currently unknown. Thus, no one has authority to represent the California Valley Miwok Tribe, and there is no authorized tribal government." (pRJN No. "8", Response to Interrogatory No. 12).

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For the reasons set forth below, each of the reasons given by the Commission are contrary to the language in the Compacts, contrary to the law, and therefore constitutes a wrongful withholding of RSTF money belonging to the Tribe.

- G. THE COMMISSION IS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN WITHHOLDING RSTF MONEY FROM THE MIWOK TRIBE
  - 1. Dixie's deposition testimony refutes the commission's defense that a tribal leadership dispute prevents it from distributing RSTF money to the tribe

Significantly, neither the Intervenors nor the Commission ever mentions Dixie's damning deposition testimony in their respective motion papers. Dixie admitted in his deposition that he had resigned as Tribal Chairman in 1999 and that his signature on his notice of resignation was not a forgery as he had previously claimed. (pRJN, Ex. "21" and "22"). This admission opens the door for the Commission to release the RSTF money to an authorized representative for the Tribe, and removes any claim of a competing tribe or a competing Tribal representative vying for the same funds. Indeed, the Complaint-in-Intervention specifically alleges that, "the essence of this action is the tribal dispute regarding the leadership of the Tribe." (RJN, Ex. "20", Page 13, lines 10-11).

Both the Intervenors and the Commission concede that the Compact requires the Commission to release the RSTF money to the Tribe "or an authorized official or agency thereof." Contrary to the Intervenors' and the

Commission's contention, however, the <u>Tribe</u>, not the BIA, determines who the authorized official will be for purposes of receiving the RSTF payments on behalf of the Tribe.

This is because of the well-settled doctrine of a Tribe's right to govern their own affairs, meaning that "Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-government." <u>Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez</u> (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 55 ("Indian tribes further remain a separate people, with power of regulating their internal and social relations").

In October 2010, Dixie signed a declaration under penalty of perjury in support of his motion for leave to intervene, stating:

"In 1999, I allowed Ms. Burley into the Tribe. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Burley alleged that I resigned as Tribal Chairman, that she represented that she spoke for the Sheep Ranch Miwok people and that she was the leader and chairperson of the Tribe. I have never consented to her claim of leadership. The document allegedly showing my resignation as Tribal Chairman is a forgery." (Emphasis added). (pRJN, Ex. "19", page 2, lines 20-25).

This declaration was proven to be <u>false</u>. Dixie testified in a subsequent deposition, <u>under the examination of his own counsel</u>, that he in fact resigned as Tribal Chairman, and that the signature appearing on a document notifying of his resignation he had earlier claimed to be a forgery was genuinely his. (pRJN, Ex. "21"). He further testified that his signature appeared on a document confirming Burley as the new Tribal Chairperson. (pRJN, Ex. "21").

In fact, in 2004 the Commission had previously taken the position that Burley was the authorized representative for the Tribe for purposes of receiving the Tribe's RSTF payments, against Dixie's claim that he was the rightful Chairman, since the BIA had at that time recognized Burley as a "person of authority." It stated:

"The Commission has been faced on more than one occasion with the prospect of making a RSTF disbursement to a tribe in the midst of a leadership In the past, it has been the practice of dispute. the Commission to refrain from disbursing the RSTF funds until the resolution of the tribal leadership dispute, in order to ensure that the funds were submitted to the proper party and address. [citation However, the Commission has recently determined that it should change this practice, in conformity with the practice of the Bureau of Indian disbursing funds to the tribal Affairs, by representative with which the federal government carries on its government-to-government relationship with the tribe. [citation omitted]. It appears to the State that the tribe's representative for such purposes Silvia Burley ("Burley"), notwithstanding what may or may not be a meritorious challenge to her leadership." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "9"). While such a policy set a bad precedent, since nothing in the Compact requires that the Commission condition RSTF payments on actions taken by the BIA, the point is that the Commission asserted in court documents that the existence of a leadership dispute should not prevent it from distributing RSTF to a Non-Compact tribe, so long as the Commission is able to <u>identify an appropriate Tribal representative</u>. Accordingly, Dixie's deposition testimony has paved the way for the Commission

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to make that determination and disburse the subject RSTF payments to Burley, the rightful representative of the Tribe.

The Intervenors' and the Commission's contention that the BIA or the ASI must decide the Tribal leadership dispute is ill-conceived and misleading. It is a "bedrock principle of federal Indian law that every tribe is 'capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself.'" Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v.Salazar (D.C. Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 935, 938; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 62. To this end, resolutions of tribal leadership disputes are internal tribal matters that must be decided by the tribe, not the BIA, the federal government or any court. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, supra.

2. The Compacts do not require that the BIA <u>recognize</u> a Non-Compact Tribe's governing body as a condition of RSTF payments.

The Commission claims it is further prevented from releasing the RSTF money to the Tribe, because the BIA does not recognize the Tribe's governing body. Aside from the ASI's decision that it does, i.e., that it is (and always has been since 1998) governed by a resolution form of government established under Resolution #GC-98-01, the trial court has jurisdiction to determine whether the language of the Compact permits the Commission to withhold RSTF money from a Non-Compact tribe because it purportedly has no recognized governing body. (12/18/2012 Ct. App. Dec., pRJN, Ex. "23," page 16). A review of the Compact shows that no such requirement exists, most likely because,

under Indian law, an Indian tribe pursuant to its inherent power of self-government, may establish any form of government that best suits its own practical, cultural, or religious needs, outside the IRA framework, and without any written constitution at all. Santa Clara Pueblo v.

Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 62-63; Pueblo of Santa Rosa v.

Fall (1927) 273 U.S. 315. Thus, whether Dixie is purportedly challenging #GC-98-01 in federal court is irrelevant, since the Tribe may operate under no written constitution at all.

In order for a Non-Compact tribe to be eligible to receive RSTF payments, all that the Compact requires is that the Non-Compact tribe be a federally-recognized tribe, i.e., that it be on the list of federally-recognized tribes in the FEDERAL REGISTER. It is undisputed that the Tribe meets this minimum requirement. (pRJN, Ex. "12" and "28")

Moreover, as observed by the ASI's August 31, 2011 decision, the Tribe has since 1998 had a resolution form of government, under Resolution #GC-98-01. (pRJN, Ex. "3," "13" and "14"). Since then, the Tribe, under Burley's leadership, has passed and adopted numerous resolutions in connection with the operation of the Tribe, including the resolution changing the name of the Tribe to the present name of the California Valley Miwok Tribe, which the BIA accepted and then made the change in the Federal Register. (pRJN, Ex. "16" and "17"). Even the Commission itself has issued checks to the California Valley Miwok Tribe, and has purportedly "set aside" RSTF payments on behalf of the

California Valley Miwok Tribe, and thus by its own actions has recognized the very same Tribal Council that changed the Tribe's name. (pRJN, Ex. "12"). Significantly, the Commission refused to answer written interrogatories asking if it contends that the Tribe had no authority to make that name change. (pRJN, Ex. "8," Spec. Interrogatory No. 20).

As the Court of Appeal in this case observed:

"[A] tribe may choose not to organize under the IRA, and many tribes have accordingly adopted constitutions using procedures not set forth in the IRA, and several tribes exist without any written constitution. (citations omitted)." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "24," Ct. of App. Dec., 4/16/2010, page 8).

Thus, for purposes of being eligible for receipt of RSTF payments, it is irrelevant whether the Tribe's current resolution form of government is "recognized" by the BIA, since, under well-settled Indian law, an Indian tribe may function and operate without a written constitution at all. Indeed, the Compact by its own terms recognizes this fundamental point of law in its definition of the term "Tribal Chairperson" as follows:

"Tribal Chairperson" means the person duly elected or selected under the Tribe's organic documents, <u>customs</u>, or <u>traditions</u> to serve as the <u>primary spokesperson</u> for the Tribe." (Emphasis added).

(pRJN, Ex. "5", Compact §2.19).

3. The Compacts do not require that a Non-Compact Tribe satisfy any membership criteria in order to be eligible for RSTF payments.

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The trial court also has jurisdiction to decide whether the Compacts require that a Non-Compact tribe demonstrate certain membership criteria in order to qualify for RSTF distribution payments. Contrary to the Commission's assertions, there is no such requirement. In fact, the Compacts specify that RSTF payments are to be made only to a Non-Compact tribe, not to any of its individual members. Thus, the Commission has no duty to "potential" members of a Non-Compact tribe, and the Compacts do not require that the Commission withhold RSTF payments for the benefit of any "potential" members of a Non-Compact tribe.

Membership enrollment is to be decided solely by an Indian tribe under well-settled Indian law, as recognized by the Court of Appeal in this case. (pRJN, Ex. "24", Ct. of App. Dec. 4/16/2010, footnote 9, page 8, citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 72, fn. 32, for the proposition that "[a] tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community...", and Williams v. Gover (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3d 785, 789, for the proposition that "[a]n Indian tribe has the power to define membership as it chooses, subject to the plenary power of Congress").

4. The Compacts do not provide that a Non-Compact tribe must qualify for P.L. 638 federal contract funding through the BIA as a condition for receipt of RSTF payments.

Lastly, the Commission argues that the Tribe's right to receive RSTF payments is contingent upon it qualifying for

federal contract funding with the BIA. However, there is no such language in the Compacts making this a condition of receipt of RSTF payments. There could be a number of reasons why federal contract funding would not be available to a particular Non-Compact tribe that would have nothing to do with eligibility to receive RSTF payments. There is no relationship between the two sources of revenue payments, and the Commission's position that it is required to withhold RSTF from the tribe on this ground is wrong.

Accordingly, each of the reasons given by the Commission for withholding the Miwok Tribe's RSTF payments since 2005 are erroneous and find no support in the language of the Compacts. Indeed, they are contrary to the express provisions in the Compacts <u>limiting</u> the Commission's discretion to serving as a mere <u>depository</u>. (§4.3.2.1(b)). It has no discretion on how the funds are to be used or whether it should withhold those funds for any reasons not set out in the Compacts. (§4.3.2.1 (b)) ("no discretion with respect to the use or disbursement of the trust funds").

5. The Commission's policy decision to withhold the subject RSTF money pending resolution the federal litigation is likewise erroneous.

As the Court of Appeal recently ruled: "[T]he fundamental issue presented to the trial court for resolution on the merits is whether the current uncertainty in the federal government's relationship to the Miwok Tribe—including the pendency of the Salazar case—constitutes a legally sufficient basis for the Commission,

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as trustee of the RSTF, to withhold the RSTF funds from the Miwok Tribe... The trial court need only acknowledge that the federal dispute is ongoing, and based on that factual predicate, determine whether the Commission has a legally sufficient basis for withholding the RSTF funds." (pRJN, Ex. "23", page 17 of Ct. App. Dec., 12/18/12). There is nothing in the pending federal litigation that would justify withholding these funds from the Tribe, largely because the Commission's duties and responsibilities with respect to disbursement of RSTF payments to the Tribe, and the Miwok Tribe's entitlement to RSTF payments, are not being litigated in the federal action. Neither is the Commission subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA or the Department of Interior ("DOI") with respect to the RSTF funds at issue here.

Accordingly, the Commission's final reason of withholding the RSTF money from the Miwok Tribe, because of the pending federal litigation is erroneous.

### H. THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE AND MANDAMUS RELIEF

In its April 16, 2010 decision, the Court of Appeal rejected the Commission's challenge to the Plaintiff's claims for declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief.

(pRJN, Ex. "24", pages 20-23 of Ct. App. Dec., 2010). This is the law of the case, and thus the Intervenors' challenge on the same grounds must be rejected. Morohishi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 482, 491.

#### III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Intervenors' motion for summary judgment should be denied. Before even reaching the merits of the Intervenors' motion, however, the court should conclude that the lifting of the trial court's April 20, 2011 stay, as directed by the Court of Appeal, reinstated the trial court's prior March 11, 2011 order denying intervention. As a result, the Intervenors, as dismissed parties, have no right to file any dispositive motions in this action.

Dated: March ( , 2013

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